



ENTERPRISE Co., 57 N. E. 581 (Md.).-Action by a corporation to recover a
stock subscription. Held, that a subscription to the capital stock of a pro-
posed corpotation cannot be enforced in the absence of a de jure organization.
A de facto organization is not sufficient.
The general rule is that a subscriber to the stock of a de facto corporation
cannot defend, in an action on his subscription, by showing that there is no de
jure organization. Buffalo & Allegany R.R. Co. v. Cary, 26 N. Y. 75. To con-
stitute a de facto corporation, there must be (1) a charter or general law under
-which the corporation might have formed; (2) an attempt to form a corpora-
tion, and actual performance of corporate acts pursuant to the charter or law.
Morawitz Corp., sec. 777. In this case it does not appear whether there was
such a performance of corporate acts as is required to constitute a de facto
corporation, and it may be distinguished from Buffalo & Allegany R.R. Co. v.
Cary supra on this ground.
CRIMINAL LAw-HousE OF ILL-FAME-STATE v. CH-AUVET, 83 N. W. 717
(Ia.).-The defendant traveled from place to place in a black covered wagon
in which prostitution was carried on. Held, guilty of keeping a house of ill-
fame.
This is the first time that a wagon has been regarded as being within a
general law against keeping "houses" of ill-fame, although some cases have
held that the term included tents. Killman v. State, 28 Am. Rep. 432; Clifton
v. State, 53 Ga. 241. A vessel on the Mississippi was held to be within the
meaning of the statute. State v. Mullen, 35 Ia. 199. State v. Powers, 36
Conn. 77, says that any building, not necessarily a dwelling, kept for immoral
purposes, is included by the statute.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES-CORPORATIONS-AGENCY-BANK v. TEL. CABLE
Co., 103 Fed. 841.-An operator employed to transmit money orders between
banks sent a forged money-order telegram over the wires. Held, the telegraph
companyis liable for the torts of its agents,but onlyincompensatorydamages.
The early theory was that a corporation was not liable in exemplary dam-
ages. But the case of Lake Shore v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101, has so far changed
this as to permit a recovery when the agent of the corporation has been act-
ing within the scope of his authority. The position of this telegraph operator,
accustomed to send money-order telegrams, would seem to be within the rule
of this case. But Railroad Co. v. Prentice lays down a principle that is ex-
tremely difficult of application. An agent is hardly ever acting within the scope
of his authority when he does a deliberately wrongful act. Consequently,
Railroad Co. v. Prentice, instead of extending, puts satisfactory limits upon
the doctrine of exemplary damages, and the present case is an illustration of
its limitations.
HIGHWAYS--ABUTTING OwNERS--BICYCLE PATHS-RYAN V. PRESTON, 66
N. Y. Sup. 162.-Action by an abutting owner, holding fee in the highway to
its center, to restrain side-path commissioners from constructing and main-
taining a bicycle side-path. Held, such a side-path could be constructed.
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Where land is taken for a country highway, leaving the fee in the abutting
owner, it is impliedly dedicated to the use which the public may in the future
require. Palmer v. Electric Co., 158 N. Y. 231. And that the use of bicycles
has become so extensive and almost universal that the public require that a
portion of the highway be set aside for their exclusive use.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-CHILD PLAYING IN STREET-IMPUTED NEG-
LIGENCE OF PARENT.-66 N. Y. Sup. 280.-Child, three years old, who had
been playing on the sidewalk, ran out into the street, and was run over and
killed by a truck. Held, it was not negligence per se on the part of tle parents
to permit the child to go unattended upon the public street.
This subject is in a very unsatisfactory state, but this decision, concurrently
with other recent decisions on the same point, seems to take a more practical
and reasonable view than the previous one held by the courts of the same
state. See Birkett v. Ice Co., 110 N. Y. 504; and, contra, Hartfeld v. Roper,
21 Wendell 615. Also, Cooley on Torts pp. 680-683, and cases therein cited.
HOMICIDE-RIGHT TO COLORED MAN ON JURY-BULLOCK V. STATE, 47
Atl. 63 (N. J.).-The accused, a colored man, was convicted of murder. At the
return of the panel, the defendant's counsel challenged the array, on the ground
that no colored man was returned on the panel. Challenge overruled and ex-
ception taken. Held, that unless return was made designedly it did not de-
prive him of the rights granted by the Fourteenth amendment.
This is certainly the law. But if colored men had been wilfully excluded in
the selection of the jury, it would have been a violation of the Act of Congress
of 1878, forbidding such discrimination. Strauderv. West Virginia, 100 U. S.
303.
INJUNCTIoN-THREATENING SUITS FOR -INFRINGEMENT OF PATENTS-DAVID-
SON ET AL v. NATI(NAL HARRow Co., 103 Fed. 360.-Defendant sent circulars
threatening the customers of the complainant with infringement suits. Held,
on motion for an injunction, that it would not be granted as long as the pro-
priety of granting it is doubtful and all allegations of fraud, notice and bad
faith are absent
The decision in this case is one of a number that have appeared since Kidd
v. Horry, 28 Fed. 773. It shows more cearly than any other what the atti-
tude of the court will be bereafter. The fact that the plaintiff may have an
adequate remedy at law makes the granting of injunctions in such cases as
these a doubtful matter, consequently the court is rightly conservative in refus-
ing to grant an injunction except on the clearest case of provocation. SeeA.B.
Farquahar Co. Ltd. v. National Harrow Co., 99 Fed. 160. 9 Yale Law Jour-
nal333.
INSOLVENT CORPORATIONS-CLAIMS FOR SERvCEs-LNoR ET AL v. Lux-
VILLE IMPROVEMENT Co., 36 S. ]B. 185.-A corporation having gone into insol-
vency, a receiver was duly appointed. The president and secretary of the
corporation sued for the balance of their salaries due while the corporation
was in the hands of the receiver. Held, they could not recover, as there was no
breach of a contract.
Two views have been put forth on this question : The New Jersey court, in
Spaderv. Manufacturing Co., 20 Atl. 378, held that claims for damages aris-
ing from breaches of contract for services, caused by the insolvency of the de-
fendant corporation, are entitled to be paid pro rata out of the funds in the
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hands of the receiver. In New York, in People v. Insurance Co., 91 N. Y. 174
the following view, adopted in this court, is taken: That the state by its
actions had so paralyzed the acts of both contracting partiesthat performance
by either party was made impossible. In the case before us, the receiver, by
order of the court, had taken control of the property of the company; any in-
terference, therefore, with his duties by the plaintiffs would have been punish-
able as a contempt of court. During the receivership, therefore, being unable
to perform and not performing their duties, they have not earned any salary
for that period, and cannot recover damages for a breach of contract when the
defendant had been guilty of no breach.
JOINT NEGLIGENCE-PROXIMATE CAUSE-ORDINARY CARE-WHEELER V.
GIBBON, 36 S. E. 277.-The plaintiff, in attempting to cross a city street in a
violent storm, held his umbrella at his side, pointing down the street in the
direction from which the storm was coming, thereby obscuring his view in that
direction. He was knocked down and injured by the defendant, who was driv-
ing rapidly up the street with his oilcloth up in front of his buggy. The jury
in the trial court found joint negligence, rendering a verdict for the plaintiff.
Held on appeal that a finding for the plaintiff cannot be reviewed.
In the present case, both plaintiff and defendant were negligent, but the
effect of plaintiffis negligence could have been avoided by the exercise of ordi-
nary care on the part of defendant, which fact, the court holds, entitles plain-
tiff to a judgment, even though plaintiff's negligence contributed to the injury,
opposing the doctrine maintained by many courts that if plaintiffs negligence
contributed to the injury he is not entitled to recover. See Railway Co. v. Ives,
144 U. S., 408, and also Neal v. Gilbert, 23 Conn., 437.
MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE-BENEFICIARIES-MURDER OF ASSURED--LIA-
BILITIES OF COMPANY--SCHMIDT v. NORTHERN LIFE AssN., 83 N.W. 800 (Ia.).
-Beneficiary in a certificate of insurance murdered the assured. Held,that she
thereby forfeited all rights under the certificate, but the company was not re-
lieved of responsibility.
The nearest American cases in point are those where an assured has im-
properly designated a beneficiary, which event does not make the policy void,
but the insurance becomes payable to those who would have taken it in the
absence of any appointment. Shea v. Assn., 160 Mass. 289; Burns v. Grand
Lodge, 26 N. E. 443; Britton v. Supreme Council, 46 N. J. Eq. 102. The court
followed the celebrated English case of Cleaver v. Assn., (1892) 1 Q. B. Div.
17, which was much like the case at bar, and accordingly held that the certifi-
cate reverted to and became a part of the assured's estate.
NEW TRIAL-MsCOxDuCT OF JUROR-BARKER ET AL V. STEWART, 36 S.
E. 238.-The attorney for one of the parties, while on the street, seeing one of
the jurors suffering from an ailment, suggested a certain remedy as likely to
benefit him. They both entered a drug store, and the attorney paid for and
procured the medicine. The attorney did not know that the man was on the
jury, and the juror intended to pay for it himself. Verdict was obtained bythe
attorney's client, and this appeal taken to set it aside. Held, that, under the
circumstances, the conduct of counsel and juror did not militate against the
purity of j!ury trial, and therefore the verdict of the trial court should not be
disturbed.
It was similarly held in Railroad v. Wiggins, 18 S. B. 187. Here, the plain-
tiff, in a suit for damages from spinal injuries, was assisted downstairs by one
of the jurors during a recess of the court, after trial had begun. Such acts of
courtesy and civility are but the common expression of human kindness, and
should be favored rather than discountenanced.
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RAILR OADS-CoNSTRUCTION IN STREETs-CoNsENT OF MUNICIPALITY-PRE-
SumPTION OF GRANT-TowN or NEWCASTLE v. LAKE BRIE & W. R. R., 57 N.
B. 516 (Ind.).-Action to compel a railroad company to remove its tracks
from the streets of a municipality. Held, in this state municipalities have
authority, under their generalpowers, to grant railroad companies the right
to lay tracks longitudinally upon the streets, provided this use does not impair
the use of the street as a highway by the general public.
The general rule is that power to authorize the laying of tracks in streets
must be expressly delegated to municipalities. "The usual and ordinary pow-
ers of municipalities to regulate streets and keep them free from obstructions
are not sufficient, it is believed, to empower them to authorize the use thereof
for the purposeof constructingand operating thereon a steam railroad, at least
between different towns in the state, since such powers are not to be enlarged
by construction and were not conferred for this purpose." Dillon Mun. Corp.,
sec. 705. In Kentucky, Iowa and Indiana, this power is implied and need not
be expressly delegated. Des Moines v. Val. R.R., 29 Iowa 148; Kistner v. In-
dianapolis, 100 Ind. .10; R.R. Co. v. Applegate & Dana (Ky.) 289; Wolfe v.
R.R. Co., 15 Munroe (Ky.) 404.
STREET RAILWAYS-ADDITIONAL BURDEN-NEw USE OF STREET-TROLLEY
LINE-LACROSSE CITY RY. Co. v. HIGBEE, 83 N. W. 70 (Wis.).-Action to en-
join defendant from cutting down an electric street railroad pole, which, having
been erected at the outer edge of his sidewalk, he claimed imposed an addition-
al burden. On appeal, the defendant was enjoined.
Hobart v. Railroad Co., 27 Wis. 194, held, that a street railway, if it did
not materially interfere with travel or ingress and egress rights of adjoining
property owners, did not impose an additional burden on the fee of the street,
as it was but an improved method of using the street. The defendant relied on
Krueger v. Telephone Co., 81 N. W. 1041,which held,that telephone poles were
an additional burden. The court distinguished these two doctrines by saying
that the latter was a new use of the street, while the former was but a new
mode of devoting the street to public travel, its original purpose. The poles
were a necessary accompaniment of the electric road, and the defendant was
therefore enjoined from cutting them down.
WAIVER OF CONDITION BTy AGENT-AUTHORITY OF AGENT-POLICY OF IN-
SURANCE AS EVIDENCE olt AGENT'S AUTHORITY-UNITED STATES LIFE INS. Co.
v. LESSER, 28 Sou. Rep. 646 (Ala.).-The policy contained a provision that
only the president, secretary and actuary of the company could make or alter
contracts or waive forfeitures. Held, this condition was not binding on the in-
sured unless the insurance company strictly enforced it and abided by it on
their part, and parol testimony was admissible to show that this limitation on
agent's authority had been removed by the ratification of acts done by the
agent in excess of the limitation.
This is opposed to the rule that parol testimony is not admissible to vary
the terms of a written contract, but the court ruled that agency is a fact; if
the written statement expresses the fact it is binding; if it does not, the insur-
ance company ought not to derive the benefit of an actual extended authority
while it takes refuge behind the barrier of a limited written one when a ques-
tion of liability arises. This view is supported by Norton v.InsuranceCo.,96U.
S. 234, and Wyman v. Insurance Co., 119 N. Y. 274. The contrary view is ta-
ken by Kyte v. Insurance, 149 Mass. 114, where it is said, "No waiver of for-
feiture for condition broken will be effectual except the waiver is made in the
manner prescribed in the policy."
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WILLs-DisposAL or TRUST ESTATE-HUMPHREY V. CAMPBELL, 37 S. E.
26 (S. C.)-Held, where a trust deed directed the trustee to pay the income of
the estate to the testatrix for life, and provided that she should have power to
dispose of the estate by will, and testatrix by will gave the estate to certain
persons, the appointees not being those who would have inherited by the laws
of descent, the trust estate on the death of the testatrix was not subject to the
payment of her debts.
This case follows certain old South Carolina cases, Bentham v. Smith,
Cheves Eq. 33; Wilson v. Gaines, 9 Rich. Eq. 420; but is opposed to the well-
recognized rule thatwhere a person has a general power of appointment, either
by will or deed, and executes it, the property is deemed part of the assets and
is subject to creditors. Am. Eng. Ency. of Law, 18-986 ; Brandies v. Cock-
rane, 112 U. S. 352; Clapp v. Ingraham, -126 Mass. 210.
WILLs-CoNsTRuCTON-CREATON or TRUsT-ENoRCEMENT OF PROVIS-
IONS W EQUITY-COLLISTER V. FASsiTT (N. Y.), 57 N. E. Rep. 490.-The fourth
paragraph of the testator's will was as follows: "I direct my wife, out of the
property hereinafter given and bequeathed to her, by this will, to use so much
thereof for the support and benefit of my niece [the plaintiff] as my said wife
shall from time to time in her discretion think best to do." Upon suit being
brought by the niece to enforce the trust, the court below decreed that the tes-
tator's wife should pay her $1000 a year. Affirmed. Three of the judges dis-
sent on the ground that, independent of the question whether a trust was cre-
ated by this clause, it was clear that the amount, if any, to be paid, was left
entirely to the discretion of the wife.
The majority opinion is in accordance with the view of the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Colton v. Colton, 127 U. S. 300, where the pro-
vision was. "I recommend to her [the defendant] the care and protection of my
mother and sister and request her to make such gift and provision for them as
in her judgment will be best." It was there held that a trust was created and
that it was the duty of the court to ascertain what provision would be
suitable.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (MICH.)-LICENSE-CLASS LEGISLATION-VALENTINE
v. BERRIEN CICUIT JUDGE, 83 N. W. 594 (Mich.).-Party was arrested for
non-compliance with law requiring merchants, who sell produce upon commis-
sion, to execute a bond, in the penal sum of $5000, conditioned for faithful per-
formance of their contract and payment of licenses. Held, that the law was
unconstitutional.
This act was not aimed at brokers or commission merchants generally, but
solely at dishonest sellers who pack their produce in such a manner as to de-
ceive. The regulation did not fall within the police power of the state, as the
business, properly conducted, was in no way detrimental to the health, morals
or peace of the community, and the law afforded ample remedy for cheating.
The justices accordingly held the law unconstitutional on the ground of its be-
ing class legislation and an unjustifiable interference with the right of citizens
to carry on legitimate business.
CoxTRAcTs-DELAY-DAmAGES-REMOTENESS-ATLANTIC & D. Ry. Co. v.
DnLAWARE CoNs. Co. ET AL, 37 S. E.13 (Va.).-Contractorsagreedtodo cer-
tain work within a certain time and failed to complete it within that time.
The railroad was compelled to decline a shipment of goods upon this account,
and claimed damages for loss of profit from this shipment. Held, that such
profits were too remote and speculative.
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This case is probably in line with the weight of authority, as it is said that
it is wholly uncertain whether any profit would have resulted from the ship-
ment. Bunmuss v. Hines, 94 Va. 413, 26 S. R. 875; Central Trust Co. ofN. Y.
v. Clark, 92 F. 293, 34 C. C. A. 354; Taylor Manufacturing Co. v. Hatcher &
Co., 3 L. R. A. 58.7. But damages are given for loss of rental where house had
not been rented and it is not known that it would have been. Covode v. Pin-
c4paal, 68 N. W. 987.
